Abstract
AbstractWhat happens when conservation interventions ostensibly fail? We outline a REDD+ intervention on Zanzibar, Tanzania which is adapting to a failure to implement carbon compensation payments and to the increased global price of cloves. Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods we provide preliminary evidence that well‐managed shehia (wards) with registered Community Forestry Management Agreements (CoFMAs) are slowing their rates of deforestation. We also find an increase in the number of shehia with CoFMAs despite the absence of carbon payments. Using this island‐wide case study we make inferences about the mechanisms whereby institutional expansion has occurred in ways consistent with cultural evolutionary dynamics of institutional change. We draw lessons for planning and practice that may help with the design of future conservation interventions and with bolstering the morale and effectiveness of disappointed partners.
Highlights
The sustainable management of common pool resources requires trust and cooperation among users
Given the challenge for sustainability scientists to identify and clarify the mechanisms involved in institutional change (Brooks, Waring, Borgerhoff Mulder, & Richerson, 2018; Ostrom, 2009; Waring et al, 2015) we describe the case of an apparently failing Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) project to explore how, despite the absence of carbon payments, some of the institutional features of the intervention have persisted and spread
We provide empirical evidence of the dynamic processes whereby the Community Forestry Management Agreements (CoFMA) delivered by the REDD+ intervention have percolated across the island despite the failure of REDD+ to eventually deliver on carbon payments, its principal objective
Summary
The sustainable management of common pool resources requires trust and cooperation among users. Given the challenge for sustainability scientists to identify and clarify the mechanisms involved in institutional change (Brooks, Waring, Borgerhoff Mulder, & Richerson, 2018; Ostrom, 2009; Waring et al, 2015) we describe the case of an apparently failing Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) project to explore how, despite the absence of carbon payments, some of the institutional features of the intervention have persisted and spread. We present this as a Conservation Science and Practice. For these reasons most agree that monitoring of non-carbon outcomes (namely cobenefits such as livelihoods, tenure security, equitable benefit sharing, and biodiversity [Hinsley, Entwistle, & Pio, 2015]) is of critical importance
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