Abstract

America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially a combination of its Asia-Pacific and Indian strategies: through the consolidation of its strategic alliances, it can deepen its relations with Asia-Pacific allies, and through its “wedging strategy” it can pull India into its orbit to become a strategic “fulcrum” bridging the region. India was both a key member and leader of the non-aligned movement, while also previously forming a “quasi-alliance” with the Soviet Union. At present, it has responded to the US Indo-Pacific strategy with cautious initiative. From the vantage point of a state targeted vis-à-vis a wedging strategy, India’s strategic behavior is shaped by the strategic environment, its primary strategic objectives, and the relations between allies within the context of a unique strategic environment. This paper identifies two types of strategic environments: the general strategic environment and the specialized strategic environment; it further identifies primary strategic objectives as economic development, sovereign integrity and independence, national security and great state status (especially with respect to that of regional or global major powers); meanwhile, the alliance relationship is defined according to the extent to which there are divisions across state interests and the capacity of states to act autonomously vis-à-vis the alliance. Through an analysis of India’s diplomatic experiences, this paper argues that against the backdrop of America’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy and a lose general strategic environment, the primary strategic objective of achieving major state status and a “large divide over interests and a major space for autonomous action” shape India’s cautious initiative with respect to its alliance relationships.

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