A Sense of Professionalism Predicts Increased Acceptance and Influence from Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Gift-giving is common practice in business, but gifts can elicit feelings of reciprocity that create managerial conflicts of interest. Organizations often try to guard against unwanted influence by fostering managerial professionalism. We develop, and empirically investigate, the theoretical argument that a sense of professionalism may paradoxically increase managers’ vulnerability to accepting, and being influenced by, small gifts that represent a conflict of interest. A sense of professionalism can inadvertently bias managers toward gift-givers because confidence in the ability to regulate unwanted influence increases the likelihood that managers will accept gifts. Moreover, once a gift is accepted, managers’ self-perceived professionalism and accompanying certainty that they cannot be influenced may foster under-correction of influence. A lab experiment and three studies on over 1500 experienced U.S. managers spanning a range of industries demonstrate that it is precisely those who believe they are the least vulnerable, by virtue of their sense of professionalism, who are most likely to accept gifts, and to be influenced by them, without recognizing the influence. A sense of professionalism alone does not protect against conflicts of interest thus organizations must use other strategies to address this challenge.