Abstract
To avoid the low efficiency in Internet routing, end users adopt many routing technologies, such as source routing and active routing. As the result of user’s participation, these routing technologies possess selfish character. Firstly, selfish routing game model is put forward in the paper based on the discussion of selfish routing problem. And then, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point. Moreover, atomic and non-atomic routing in game model is discussed. Finally, SRAG algorithm is simulated in the specific network environment. The results of simulation show the good routing results of SRAG. The feasibility and effectivity of the algorithm is suggested by the results of experiment.KeywordsCost FunctionNash Equilibrium PointTransfer DelayParallel LinkBraess ParadoxThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
