A Self-Diagnosis Method for Detecting UAV Cyber Attacks Based on Analysis of Parameter Changes.

Elena Basan,Alexandr Basan,Colin Fidge,Mária Gamcová,Alexey Nekrasov,Ján Gamec

doi:10.3390/s21020509

Abstract

We consider how to protect Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attacks to provide safe navigation. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is widely used for locating drones and is by far the most popular navigation solution. This is because of the simplicity and relatively low cost of this technology, as well as the accuracy of the transmitted coordinates. Nevertheless, there are many security threats to GPS navigation. These are primarily related to the nature of the GPS signal, as an intruder can jam and spoof the GPS signal. We discuss methods of protection against this type of attack and have developed an experimental stand and conducted scenarios of attacks on a drone’s GPS system. Data from the UAV’s flight log were collected and analyzed in order to see the attack’s impact on sensor readings. From this we identify a new method for detecting UAV anomalies by analyzing changes in internal parameters of the UAV. This self-diagnosis method allows a UAV to independently assess the presence of changes in its own subsystems indicative of cyber attacks.

Highlights

A drone or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a cyber-physical system combining physical processes, computation, and networking
In addition to the natural errors and inaccuracies in sensor readings, Global Positioning System (GPS) vulnerabilities affect the flight controller. These vulnerabilities include the possibility of signal jamming or a signal distortion that disrupts the availability of the GPS signal
Instead we present a method for detecting anomalies and attacks on UAVs based on the analysis of data collected and analyzed from the UAV’s own sensors only

Summary

Introduction

A drone or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a cyber-physical system combining physical processes, computation, and networking. If an attack on the Global Positioning System (GPS) is executed well, it can lead to serious consequences for a single UAV or a UAV group [1]. In addition to the natural errors and inaccuracies in sensor readings, GPS vulnerabilities affect the flight controller. These vulnerabilities include the possibility of signal jamming or a signal distortion that disrupts the availability of the GPS signal. GPS vulnerabilities go beyond the natural properties of the transmitted signal. In GPS spoofing attacks, satellites transmitting a GPS signal are tampered with to manipulate the UAV’s navigation system by transmission of fake coordinates [2,3]. Civilian GPS is highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks [3]

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