Abstract

The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) issued a proposed rule on January 12, 2017 to mandate vehicle-to-vehicle safety communications in light vehicles in the U.S. Cybersecurity and privacy are major challenges for such a deployment. We present a Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications in this paper, which has been developed by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partners LLC under a cooperative agreement with the USDOT. This system design is currently transitioning from research to proof-of-concept and is a leading candidate to support the establishment of a nationwide Public Key Infrastructure for V2X security. It issues digital certificates to participating vehicles and infrastructure devices for trustworthy communications among them, which is necessary for safety and mobility applications that are based on V2X communications. The SCMS supports four main use cases, namely, bootstrapping, certificate provisioning, misbehavior reporting, and revocation. The main design goal is to provide both security and privacy to the largest extent reasonable and possible. To achieve a reasonable level of privacy in this context, vehicles are issued pseudonym certificates, and the generation and provisioning of those certificates are divided among multiple organizations. Given the large number of pseudonym certificates per vehicle, one of the main challenges is to facilitate efficient revocation of misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicles, while preserving privacy against attacks from insiders. The proposed SCMS supports all identified V2X use-cases and certificate types necessary for V2X communication security. This paper is based upon work supported by the USDOT. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors (“we”) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the USDOT.

Highlights

  • Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications between nearby vehicles in the form of continuous broadcast of Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) has the potential to reduce unimpaired vehicle crashes by 80% through active safety applications [1]

  • To maintain privacy against outside attackers, we propose that end-entity devices are issued with a large number of certificates and that they make frequent changes in the certificates accompanying BSMs

  • For providing an acceptable level of privacy for V2V safety communication applications using BSMs and pseudonym certificates, some distinct logical functions must be provided by distinct organizations, in order to prevent a single organization from being able to determine which pseudonym certificates belong to a device

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Summary

A Security Credential Management System for V2X Communications

Benedikt Brecht¶, Dean Therriault , Andre Weimerskirch†, William Whyte∗, Virendra Kumar∗, Thorsten Hehn‡, Roy Goudy§. The authors present a Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications in this paper, which has been developed by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partners LLC (CAMP) under a Cooperative Agreement with the USDOT. This system design is currently transitioning from research to Proof-of-Concept, and is a leading candidate to support the establishment of a nationwide Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for V2X security. The SCMS supports four main use cases, namely bootstrapping, certificate provisioning, misbehavior reporting and revocation. The proposed SCMS supports all identified V2X use-cases and certificate types necessary for V2X communication security.

INTRODUCTION
SCMS DESIGN OVERVIEW
Threat Models and Application Concepts
Intermediate CA
Certificate Provisioning Model
CERTIFICATE TYPES
BUTTERFLY KEY EXPANSION
RSE Enrollment Certificate
Security of Butterfly Keys
DEVICE BOOTSTRAPPING AND CERTIFICATE PROVISIONING
Device Bootstrapping
Overview of Certificate Provisioning
Linkage Values
Misbinding Attacks
Detailed Description of Pseudonym Certificate Provisioning Process
REMOVING MISBEHAVING DEVICES
Misbehavior Reporting
Global Misbehavior Detection
Misbehavior Investigation
CRL Size and CRL Distribution
CRL Series
CRL PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION
VIII. RE-ENROLLMENT
ELECTOR-BASED ROOT MANAGEMENT
Structure of Ballots
ORGANIZATIONAL SEPARATION
Findings
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Full Text
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