Abstract

ABSTRACT Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament are faced with a dilemma in the European Parliament as they might be supportive of the legislative text proposed while opposing EU’s legislative powers. Both ideological disagreements with the legislative texts and Euroscepticism is expected to influence voting behaviour in the European Parliament. However, this article hypothesizes that Euroscepticism works as a ‘second-order’-agenda having more impact on voting behaviour when issue salience is low. The article provides a unique theoretical perspective on legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. It combines data on MEP voting behaviour during roll call votes in the 7th European Parliament with expert evaluations of the ideological positions towards and opposition to EU integration among national parties. The results show that opposition to EU integration has a significant influence on legislative behaviour, even within the most pro-EU political groups. The impact of Euroscepticism declines as issue salience increase.

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