“A Second Ireland”: Palestine in the Eyes of the British Military (1936—1939)

Abstract

The article analyses the gaps and ties between the doctrine and theory, in contrast with the practice, of countering subversive movements in the British Empire within the frame of the example of the Arab rebellion of 1936—1939. Contradictions between security services on this question, objectivated by the experience of the Irish war of independence of 1919—1921 took for granted as referenced, led to the articulation and promotion of different models of counterinsurgency instead of the unified “British way” of resolving that problem. In the light of this the research contains an analysis of the “guerrilla warfare concept” evolution within the military thought in the second half of the 1930s, reflecting different thoughts on interrelated problems of the “revolutionary movements” and “sub-war” on the overseas territories, including Palestine. Particular attention is paid for military and political incentives and constrains of the counterinsurgency doctrine, reflected bureaucratic logic which stood behind the implementation of the guerrilla warfare concept at the levels of doctrine and theory in the context of the systemic crisis of empire and the growth of external pressure over the questions of the imperial defense and self-determination for the colonies.