Abstract

This article discusses the provable security of an iterated hash function using a block cipher. It assumes the construction using the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) scheme for the compression function and the Merkle-Damgård with a permutation (MDP) for the domain extension transform. It is shown that this kind of hash function, MDP-MMO, is indifferentiable from the variable-input-length random oracle in the ideal cipher model. It is also shown that HMAC using MDP-MMO is a pseudorandom function if the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation under the related-key attack with respect to the permutation used in MDP. Actually, the latter result also assumes that the following function is a pseudorandom bit generator: $$ (E_{IV}(K\oplus\texttt{opad})\oplus K\oplus\texttt{opad})\| (E_{IV}(K\oplus\texttt{ipad})\oplus K\oplus\texttt{ipad})\enspace, $$ where E is the underlying block cipher, IV is the fixed initial value of MDP-MMO, and opad and ipad are the binary strings used in HMAC. This assumption still seems reasonable for actual block ciphers, though it cannot be implied by the pseudorandomness of E as a block cipher. The results of this article imply that the security of a hash function may be reduced to the security of the underlying block cipher to more extent with the MMO compression function than with the Davies-Meyer (DM) compression function, though the DM scheme is implicitly used by the widely used hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5.KeywordsHash FunctionBlock CipherRandom OracleCompression FunctionDomain ExtensionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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