Abstract
In order to improve the security in remote authentication systems, numerous biometric-based authentication schemes using smart cards have been proposed. Recently, Moon et al. presented an authentication scheme to remedy the flaws of Lu et al.’s scheme, and claimed that their improved protocol supports the required security properties. Unfortunately, we found that Moon et al.’s scheme still has weaknesses. In this paper, we show that Moon et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, server spoofing attack, user impersonation attack and guessing attack. Furthermore, we propose a robust anonymous multi-server authentication scheme using public key encryption to remove the aforementioned problems. From the subsequent formal and informal security analysis, we demonstrate that our proposed scheme provides strong mutual authentication and satisfies the desirable security requirements. The functional and performance analysis shows that the improved scheme has the best secure functionality and is computational efficient.
Highlights
Nowadays security has becoming an urgent issue for the distributed networks
To evaluate the security of the improved scheme, we assume that the adversary might access the smart card of legal user and extract the information stored in the smart card and intercept information transmitted over the public channel
Assume a legal user’s smart card is Robust anonymous biometric-based authenticated key agreement scheme stolen by an adversary and the stored information < Vi, Wi, h(Á), H(Á) > on it are extracted
Summary
Nowadays security has becoming an urgent issue for the distributed networks. The remote user authentication scheme allows the transmission of secret data via public channels, is an important cryptographic tool for distributed networks. Chaturvedi et al [26] demonstrated that Li et al.’s scheme doesn’t resist known session specific temporary information attack and doesn’t protect user’s privacy They proposed a novel authentication and key agreement protocol to overcome the weaknesses of Li et al.’s scheme. Mishra et al [28] showed that Chuang-Chen’s scheme is insecure against the denial-of-service attack, smart card stolen attack, server spoofing attack and impersonation attack They proposed a new biometric-based multi-server authentication protocol so as to overcome the weaknesses of Chuang-Chen’s scheme. In 2015, Lu et al [29] illustrated that Mishra et al.’s scheme is insecure against server spoofing attack and impersonation attack, and can not provide forward secrecy They introduced two independent three-factor authentication schemes [29, 31] for multi-server architecture, and claimed that the improved scheme has strong security.
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