Abstract
This paper presents a rewriting strategy for the analysis and the verification of communication protocols. In a way similar to the approximation technique defined by Genet and Klay, a rewrite system R specifies the protocol and a tree automaton A describes the initial set of communication requests. Given a term t that represents a property to be proved, a rewriting strategy is defined that suitably expands and reduces t using the rules in R and the transitions in A to derive whether or not t is recognized by an intruder. This is done by simulating a completion process in a bottom-up manner starting from t and trying to derive a transition t → qf from critical pairs, where qf is a final state of the tree automaton. The rewriting strategy is defined through a set of inference rules and used for reasoning about the authentication and secrecy properties of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol.
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