Abstract
ABSTRACT It has been argued that the criterion of right intention adds nothing in just war theory – that it is subsumed by other conditions on just war. It has also been argued that there is no tenable reading of the criterion at all, and in particular that taking it as a positive requirement on the state's motives is after all incoherent in a way that would make it impossible to satisfy. This article gives an action-theoretic analysis of (one central understanding of) the criterion and uses it to examine arguments that have been offered for the strong negative claims above. It is shown that none of these arguments succeed. Our endeavor brings welcome clarity and understanding to our own ideas about the criterion.
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