A Resilience Evaluation Framework on Ultrasonic Microphone Jammers

Abstract

Covert eavesdropping via microphones has always been a major threat to user privacy. Benefiting from the acoustic non-linearity property, the ultrasonic microphone jammer (UMJ) is effective in resisting this long-standing attack. However, prior UMJ researches underestimate adversary's attacking capability in reality and miss critical metrics for a thorough evaluation. The strong assumptions of adversary unable to retrieve information under low word recognition rate, and adversary's weak denoising abilities in the threat model make these works overlook the vulnerability of existing UMJs. As a result, their UMJs' resilience is overestimated. In this paper, we refine the adversary model and completely investigate potential eavesdropping threats. Correspondingly, we define a total of 12 metrics that are necessary for evaluating UMJs' resilience. Using these metrics, we propose a comprehensive framework to quantify UMJs' practical resilience. It fully covers three perspectives that prior works ignored to some degree, i.e., ambient information, semantic comprehension, and collaborative recognition. Guided by this framework, we can thoroughly and quantitatively evaluate the resilience of existing UMJs towards eavesdroppers. Our extensive assessment results reveal that most existing UMJs are vulnerable to sophisticated adverse approaches. We further outline the key factors influencing jammers' performance and present constructive suggestions for UMJs' future designs.