Abstract

In order to protect the occupational health and safety of migrant workers, government has developed a series of regulations, policies, and requires enterprises to pay injury insurance costs for migrant workers. Most of migrant workers concentrate in small and medium enterprises (SME’s). The intrinsic motivation that SMEs will pay the cost of industrial injury insurance for migrant workers is not strong. The migrant workers also do not want SMEs to pay the costs. Therefore, proceeding from the fundamental interests of the SMEs and migrant workers, the article is based on Evolutionary Game approach and analyzes the evolution paths of SMEs’ behaviors. The research provides the reliable theory reference for Chinese government to adjust the industrial injury insurance policy and protect the occupational health and safety of migrant workers’.

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