A reply: The future of international morality

Abstract

Stephen W. Bali 's review of my Morality among Nations: an Evolutionary View (July? 1992:316-377) invites a reply on several points. Here I shall first dispute Ball on the value of relying on "philosophical ethics," then use his helpful criticism to clarify my position on "genuine motivation" and on sympathy. Lastly, I shall respond to his complaint that I have failed to predict the "triumph" of international morality. Ball indicates that I (roughly) endorse the emotivists' position without crediting those philosophers by name (p. 365). All right: I concede that A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson anticipated certain sociobiological insights. Some moral talk does merely reflect the opinion or emotion of the speaker. I f I say "Stealing is bad," that may well reflect how I feel about the matter and not be an "objective statement" about the "objective" goodness or badness of stealing. Indeed, the emotivists support one main point that was later expostulated by Robert Trivets and another main point of Richard Alexander's. From Trivers we learn that the feeling expressed in the cry "Stealing is bad 'may reflect the moral emotions that came about in conjunction with monitoring reciprocal altruism. Such emotions anger and indignation could be directed, in the earliest stages, to the very person who has stolen something from Ego. ("You rotten creep! You stole from me.") Later, the emotion of indignation may be experienced when Ego hears of even a remote case of stealing such as by a corrupt official in a far-off city. ("O tempora, 0 mores.") (Here I note as an aside that Ball [(pp. 369-370)] also wants me to agree with Hume that morality takes on a utilitarian function we are not talking about Utilitarianism at the moment I agree: refraining from stealing becomes part of social order one refrains in order to "fall in" with society). The other point is that argued by Alexander. From him we learn that one of the purposes of a moral system is to help Ego nudge his neighbor into better behavior than his own. Hence the emotivists' claim that the phrase "Don't steal" means deep down "I don't want you to steal from me" is borne out by Alexander's scheme of morality as a game of interests. I grant, then, that the emotivists deserve a salute yet I believe they captured only a small part of the reality of moral interactions and moral institutions (such as the debate on impartiality to which Ball refers). And, by claiming that, instead, they were explaining all of moral analysis, the emotivists did contribute to the withering of philosophical ethics for at least a few decades. I suggest that