Abstract
In a previous paper (Haan in Environ Resour Econ, 2016) I missed some relevant literature essentially related to that paper. In this addendum I discuss how two earlier contributions (Graichen et al. in Public Choice 108:273–293, 2001; Liston-Heyes in J Environ Econ Manag 41:1–12, 2001) are related to Haan (Environ Resour Econ, 2016), and how Haan (Environ Resour Econ, 2016) differs from those contributions.
Highlights
After acceptance of my paper A Rent-Seeking Model of Voluntary Overcompliance (Haan 2016), it has been brought to my attention1 that mine is not the first paper in which a polluting firm behaves more environmentally friendly in an attempt to essentially lower the stakes of an environmental group in the rent seeking game that ensues
L-H shows that, because of the contest, the developer will choose a project size π that is smaller than what she would choose without a contest
Haan (2016) is somewhat different as the firm already takes an action in stage 1, rather than just making a proposal
Summary
After acceptance of my paper A Rent-Seeking Model of Voluntary Overcompliance (Haan 2016), it has been brought to my attention1 that mine is not the first paper in which a polluting firm behaves more environmentally friendly in an attempt to essentially lower the stakes of an environmental group in the rent seeking game that ensues. 2 Related Literature In Liston-Heyes (2001) (L-H ), a developer wants to undertake a project of fixed size that will earn it profit π and cause external damage D(π), where D is increasing and convex in π. L-H shows that, because of the contest, the developer will choose a project size π that is smaller (and environmental damage that is lower) than what she would choose without a contest.
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