Abstract
This article proposes a remedial action scheme (RAS) based on thyristor-controlled series capacitors (TCSCs) to cope with false data injection (FDI) cyberattacks leading to tie-line congestions in transmission systems. To develop such a RAS, a three-level framework is designed. The first level of the framework is associated with the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">planning</i> phase, where strategic locations of TCSCs are determined. The second level, which is related to the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">operation</i> phase, challenges the upgraded system via FDI attacks, resulting in tie-line congestions. This necessitates the third level of the framework, where system operator takes advantage of a RAS based on the preinstalled TCSCs to <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">rapidly</i> alleviate the congestions caused by FDIs. The effectiveness of the developed framework is verified on two IEEE test systems, where it is assumed that a higher budget is spent on securing remote terminal units of TCSCs; hence, phasor measurement units are more prone to cyberattacks.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
