Abstract

This article proposes a remedial action scheme (RAS) based on thyristor-controlled series capacitors (TCSCs) to cope with false data injection (FDI) cyberattacks leading to tie-line congestions in transmission systems. To develop such a RAS, a three-level framework is designed. The first level of the framework is associated with the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">planning</i> phase, where strategic locations of TCSCs are determined. The second level, which is related to the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">operation</i> phase, challenges the upgraded system via FDI attacks, resulting in tie-line congestions. This necessitates the third level of the framework, where system operator takes advantage of a RAS based on the preinstalled TCSCs to <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">rapidly</i> alleviate the congestions caused by FDIs. The effectiveness of the developed framework is verified on two IEEE test systems, where it is assumed that a higher budget is spent on securing remote terminal units of TCSCs; hence, phasor measurement units are more prone to cyberattacks.

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