Abstract
SummaryThis paper conducts a laboratory experiment focused on a yes/no referendum in which the outcome is valid only if voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically in particular when the quorum is large. In our experiment, subjects are randomly divided into two groups yes and no in advance of voting, and the level of quorum changes round by round. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all subjects go to the polls, and (ii) if the quorum is large, subjects in the ex‐ante majority group go to the polls, whereas subjects in the ex‐ante minority group tend to abstain. As a result, if the quorum is large, it frequently happens that the outcome is rendered invalid because of low voter turnout. Furthermore, when the number of subjects in each referendum increases, subjects of the ex‐ante minority abstain more aggressively, and there arises room for the ex‐post minority to win if the expected number of members is similar between the two groups. Therefore, if policy makers would like to avoid the possibility of strategic abstention, then our results suggest that they should impose either no quorum or only a relatively small quorum which most voters expect will be dwarfed by the actual turnout. If policy makers also care about the possible determination of either yes or no with extremely low voter turnout, as well as strategic abstention, then a relatively small quorum is recommended.
Highlights
IntroductionImposition of participation quorums has been observed in national referendums of, for example, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia (mentioned by Corte-Real and Pereira, 2004) and local referendums of Japan and the U.S In most of these referendums, the voter turnout is required to be at least 50% for the outcomes to be valid
Imposition of participation quorums has been observed in national referendums of, for example, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia and local referendums of Japan and the U.S In most of these referendums, the voter turnout is required to be at least 50% for the outcomes to be valid
The main idea behind such a quorum requirement is statistical; that is, the vote distribution realized in a referendum is a fair sample of the opinion of the whole population only when the voter turnout is sufficiently large
Summary
Imposition of participation quorums has been observed in national referendums of, for example, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia (mentioned by Corte-Real and Pereira, 2004) and local referendums of Japan and the U.S In most of these referendums, the voter turnout is required to be at least 50% for the outcomes to be valid. Theoretical works that assume strategic voters in non-cooperative games, such as Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhaes (2010b) and Hizen and Shinmyo (2011), show that imposing such a quorum requirement can induce strategic abstention in order to try and spoil the outcome, rather than going to the polls to lose the referendum. Such behaviors may distort the outcome in favor of the minority.. In a laboratory experiment, Aguiar-Conraria, Magalhaes, and Vanberg (2013) observe decreases in participation rates for a specific participation quorum Their experimental design is based on Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1985) incomplete-information game. On the other hand, we assume symmetry between alternatives, but introduce asymmetry only in the expected number of members in the two groups, as explained below
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