A Rebel’s Best Friend? External Intervention and Local Government Ineptitude in Counterinsurgency and Peacekeeping Operations

Abstract

External military interventions, whether conducted as counterinsurgents or peacekeepers can and do succeed. They can be credible deterrents to rebels and spoilers; can offer monetary and in-kind assistance, providing for humanitarian needs and rebuilding physical infrastructure; and may provide technical assistance and protection for overseeing elections and establishing new government institutions. In the end, however, such military interventions can only buy time for local governments to develop their legitimacy with the population, to be seen as an acceptable ruling body and as an alternative preferable to war. Yet, governments often do not do this; whether through sustained corruption, overt discrimination towards ethnic or religious groups, or seemingly willful incompetence, local governments often undermine the military efforts of foreign interveners, paradoxically resulting in increasing threats to their own ability to rule. This paper discusses how divergent interests between foreign interveners and local governments, the timing of elections, and other factors can result in undermining military success for peacekeeper and counterinsurgent alike. Taking lessons from military interventions and from literature on the effects of foreign aid and democratization, this paper examines how counterinsurgents and peacekeepers may enhance the probability that local governments will act to enhance legitimacy and result in a long-lasting peace.