Abstract
This paper develops a bargaining model based on Nash (1950). To get a larger share, a negotiator has to be wealthier, more patient, and/or to have lower negotiation cost. Sometimes, negotiation may end without an agreement, but the costly consequences will bring the parties back to negotiate more seriously. Agreement is reached by the bargainers’ mutual and voluntary concession. A major difference from the Nash one is that the present model does not need personal comparison of utility.
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