A Queueing Game Based Management Framework for Fog Computing With Strategic Computing Speed Control

Abstract

In this paper, a novel management framework for fog computing with strategic computing speed control at fog nodes (FNs) is studied. In the considered model, mobile users declare requests of offloading resource-hungry computation tasks that are dynamically collected at a dedicated edge server (ES). Upon receiving these requests, the ES can decide to either self-process or delegate some workloads to third-party FNs for maximizing the overall management profit. Unlike the existing work, this paper takes into account strategic behaviors of FNs in computing speed control, i.e., each FN can strategically allocate its computing resource to maximize its utility, which consists of the benefit gained from executing offloaded tasks and the cost incurred by dissatisfied (delayed) service to its own subscribed tasks. To jointly address the long-term system performance and FNs’ strategic interactions, a scheduling mechanism integrating a noncooperative game and a queueing model is formulated. We then investigate two delegation reward settings, i.e., constant and utility-dependent delegation prices, and propose efficient adaptive algorithms to determine the optimal workload distribution at the ES and the computing speed equilibrium among FNs. Both theoretical analyses and simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed solutions and demonstrate their superiorities over counterparts.