A quantitative analysis of the effect of flexible loads on reserve markets

Abstract

We propose and analyze a day-ahead reserve market model that handles bids from flexible loads. This pool market model takes into account the fact that a load modulation in one. Direction must usually be compensated later by a modulation of the same magnitude in the opposite direction. Our analysis takes into account the gaming possibilities of producers and retailers, controlling load flexibility, in the day-ahead energy and reserve I markets, and in imbalance settlement. This analysis is carried out by an agent-based approach where, for every round, each actor uses linear programs to maximize its profit according to forecasts of the prices. The procurement of a reserve is assumed to be determined, for each period, as a fixed percentage of the total consumption cleared in the energy market for the same period. The results show that the provision of reserves by flexible loads has a negligible impact on the energy market prices but, markedly decreases the cost of reserve procurement. However, as the rate of flexible loads increases, the system operator has to rely more and more on non-contracted reserves, which may cancel out the benefits made in the procurement of reserves.