Abstract
This paper examines a problem in a welfare loss model of tax expenditures. This problem forces us to reconsider the normative efficiency argument for tax expenditures. A reformulation highlights an implicit assumption of improper government allocation contained in the original model. The reformulation suggests that subsidization is an inappropriate marginal policy tool in the charity context.
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