Abstract

The following assumptions seem plausible from the point of view of (relatively) orthodox Christianity: (1) is omnipotent; (2) is omniscient; (3) created the world; and (4) can perform miracles. In asserting that is all-powerful, I am asserting that there does not exist a specific transformation which could not effect, except for those transformations the descriptions of which are logically contradictory or entail logical contradictions. In asserting that is all-knowing, I am asserting that knows every true proposition and believes only true ones. In addition to assuming the truth of (1) (4), I also assume that each is meaningful. This final assumption requires that every predicate term which is used in a true sentence of the form God is such-andsuch must be understood as falling within the scope of the analysis of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of that predicate term. This requirement holds for both univocal predication and for analogical predication. On the hand, the assumption that (1) (4) are meaningful renders my conclusions irrelevant to those who think that is essentially unknowable-a wholly other being whose nature we can only intimate by metaphors. The argument of this paper will be that the list of four assumptions is not self-consistent, once certain necessary truths are accepted. My strategy will be to show that creating and performing miracles are both species of action and that an all-knowing being could not possibly perform an action. In executing this strategy I shall consider three plausible but mistaken ways to argue for the conclusion and then consider what I take to be a sound argument. The following seems to be a necessary truth:

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