Abstract
This article compares the provisions of the American and Swiss constitutions from a public-choice perspective. Accordingly, the Swiss Constitution is seen as one designed to bring about a transmission ofcitizens' desires into political action, whereas the U.S. Constitution is designed to prevent the misuse of granted power. The specific level of analysis employed here is the principal-agent model, which is used to examine collective decisionmaking at the constitutional, legislative, and para-constitutional levels. The article then considers the role of the courts as arbiter of constitutional questions and conflicts. Gordon Tullock has suggested a need for more comparative analyses of the U.S. and Swiss constitutions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
