A Psychometric Study of Literary-Critical Judgment

Abstract

There ought be no one more interested in the philosophy and psychology of judgment than the literary critic, and no one more interested in the than the philosopher or psychologist of judgment. Making judgments is the critic's principal activity; even the name critic is derived from a Greek word meaning to judge. But even if one is not at all interested in reflecting upon the process which has given the profession its name, the is an especially fascinating-and especially challengingobject of study for those who are engaged in such reflections. Although we usually think of judging as chiefly an evaluative activity (that is, we tend equate judgment with value-judgment), clearly that which we call literary analysis is also a judgmental process. To say, for example, that Richard III is a lyrical tragedy with a strong central character is make certain judgments about the play, though no evaluative content at all resides in the statement. All critical activity can be perceived as the making, and perhaps combining, of analytical and evaluative judgments. It would be useful, therefore, for the literary critic, as well as for the psychologist and the philosopher, gain as much understanding as possible about the process of judgment, particularly (to whatever extent possible) the special process of literary-critical judgment. It is the aim of this study provide some new information regarding that special process. The philosophy of critical judgment has been carefully discussed in the existing literature, most notably perhaps by Wayne Shumaker (1952). Shumaker treats fully the problems of both analytical and evaluative judgments, and the relations between the two, from the theoretical point of view. He explores the various logical alternatives, the several procedures available the in his work of analysis and evaluation, and he suggests which of these procedures are likely prove fruitful. He is not interested in the mental processes of critics; his inquiry is philosophical and concerns the logical implications that can be drawn from making various assumptions. Shumaker does not make statements of the form, This is how critics make judgments; he says rather, If a makes judgments in this way, the logical consequences will be these. Although speculative works such as Shumaker's do not solve all or even most of the problems of critical theory, they do provide an excellent survey of the field.