A provably secure non-iterative hash function resisting birthday attack

Abstract

To examine the integrity and authenticity of an IP address efficiently and economically, this paper proposes a new non-iterative hash function called JUNA that is based on a multivariate permutation problem and an anomalous subset product problem to which no subexponential time solutions are found so far. JUNA includes an initialization algorithm and a compression algorithm, and converts a short message of n bits which is regarded as only one block into a digest of m bits, where 80≤m≤232 and 80≤m≤n≤4096. The analysis and proof show that the new hash is one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free, and its security against existent attacks such as birthday attack and meet-in-the-middle attack is to O(2m). Moreover, a detailed proof that the new hash function is resistant to the birthday attack is given. Compared with the Chaum–Heijst–Pfitzmann hash based on a discrete logarithm problem, the new hash is lightweight, and thus it opens a door to convenience for utilization of lightweight digital signing schemes.