Abstract
The vertical merger of ATT nor do they suggest that the proposed merger was likely to result in anticompetitive effects in video content production/distribution via customer foreclosure or collusion. Rather, the results support the government’s central theory of harm: namely, that the combination would unilaterally and credibly increase the bargaining leverage of the merged entity and thereby allow it to partially foreclose rival MVPDs by increasing their affiliate fees.
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