Abstract
ABSTRACTJoseph Halpern and Judea Pearl ([2005]) draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilistic causation. 1Introduction2Preemption3Structural Equation Models4The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’5Preemption Again6The Probabilistic Case7Probabilistic Causal Models8A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition9Twardy and Korb’s Account10Probabilistic Fizzling11Conclusion
Highlights
2 Preemption 3 Structural Equation Models 4 The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’ 5 Preemption Again 6 The Probabilistic Case 7 Probabilistic Causal Models 8 A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition 9 Twardy and Korb’s Account Probabilistic Fizzling Conclusion
Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) have made progress on this front. They draw upon structural equation models (SEMs) to provide an innovative and attractive analysis of actual causation
They do not trade upon the fact that my account appeals to contingent probability raising, whereas theirs appeals to contingent probabilistic differencemaking.) So I do think that the examples that I shall present are counterexamples to the analysis of Twardy and Korb, even when that analysis is taken on its own terms, as an analysis of a more inclusive notion than that of actual causation
Summary
The investigation of actual (or ‘token’) causal relations—in addition to the investigation of generic (or ‘type’) causal relations—is an important part of scientific practice. Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) have made progress on this front They draw upon structural equation models (SEMs) to provide an innovative and attractive analysis (or ‘definition’, as they call it) of actual causation. Their analysis is closely related to analyses proposed by Pearl ([2009], Chapter 10), Hitchcock Halpern and Pearl’s analysis handles certain cases that are counterexamples to these closely related accounts 329–30; Weslake [forthcoming], Section 2), as well as handling many cases that pose problems for more traditional, non-structural equation-based analyses of actual causation The refined account preserves the core of Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis, but tweaks it slightly by strengthening one of its conditions so as to rule out certain alleged non-causes that are counted as actual causes by Halpern and Pearl’s analysis. doubt has been cast by Halpern ([unpublished], Section 1) and by Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming], Section 3) upon whether this refinement to Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis is necessary (that is, whether the alleged counterexamples to Halpern and Pearl’s analysis are genuine). I will take Halpern and Pearl’s analysis as my starting point in attempting to develop an analysis of actual causation adequate to the probabilistic case
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