A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955–1965

Abstract

yet he used the language of realism to argue that the war in Vietnam did little to serve American interests. Ideological distinctions between communism and anticommunism, he contended, did little to explain the complex dynamics of Vietnamese nationalism and anticolonialism. He feared that military involvement in Vietnam might provoke Chinese intervention as it had in Korea. Further, the United States needed to set aside what Morgenthau saw as its moralistic tendencies and accept the inevitability of compromise. He urged policymakers to substitute economic for military aid, even while warning of the limits of American in uence. Early on, Morgenthau asserted that linking U.S. policy to the Diem regime in South Vietnam would likely require an extensive commitment of resources and, in the end, prove self-defeating. His early articles sought to instruct policymakers and the public alike on what he saw as the realities in Vietnam, and they bore the marks of his liberalism and his realist perspective. His position as an academic expert granted him both the privilege and the responsibility of “speaking truth to power,” Morgenthau believed. Yet, as the war continued, he became increasingly aware of the limits of his influence, and with this awareness came a more deeply engaged opposition to U.S. policy. Morgenthau castigated the Johnson administration for its efforts to sti e dissent, challenging Cold War notions of consensus and patriotism that equated disagreement with disloyalty. Moreover, by 1965 he increasingly viewed the war not only as ill-suited to American interests but also as morally wrong. Critics had long equated Morgenthau’s brand of realism with an almost cynical amorality, rendering this turn to moral engagement all the more striking. His later articles associated the war with genocide and invoked normative standards of just war. Embracing American exceptionalism, Morgenthau dubbed Vietnam “Metternich’s war fought by the nation of Jefferson and Lincoln.”87 Morgenthau’s views had changed, but so too had antiwar opinion. By the late 1960s a more radical criticism of American politics and society had taken root on the left. These opponents of the war blamed liberalism and an understanding of international relations rooted in power politics and national interests 446 PaciŽ c Historical Review 87. Morgenthau, “What Ails America?” 19. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.200 on Thu, 01 Dec 2016 05:43:07 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms for American mistakes in Vietnam and elsewhere. Many of them called U.S. power itself, rather than the misguided decisions that led to its use, immoral. Meanwhile, those establishment Ž gures who remained supporters of American policy saw liberal defectors like Morgenthau, no less than members of the radical left, as traitors. As a nationally known intellectual, Morgenthau’s views helped shape public opinion and policy in the 1950s. By the end of the 1960s, however, he found himself ostracized by an establishment bent on victory in Vietnam as well as by a radical antiwar movement that distrusted intellectual liberals and realist theories. Thus, Hans Morgenthau became an outcast in a world he had helped create, a prophet without honor in his own house. Since 1955 he had devoted thousands of words to criticism and warning about the disaster that awaited the American commitment in Vietnam, yet he proved unable to change the policies he opposed. Instead, he watched as his warnings went unheeded, his prophesies came to pass, and his own ideas and beliefs were held responsible. Hans Morgenthau and Vietnam 447 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.200 on Thu, 01 Dec 2016 05:43:07 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms