Abstract
Several variations and generalizations of the Voting Paradox show that social-preference cycles are not peculiar to majority rule. I offer a new generalization that is demonstrably as general as possible: a relaxation of majority rule is necessary for a cycle of any sort and sufficient for a dominant one—given certain background assumptions, few and familiar. In its “Latin square” proof as well as its assumptions, the sufficiency theorem directly generalizes both the Voting Paradox and Sen's Liberal Paradox.
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