A problem with the fixed past fixed

Abstract

A novel fatalistic argument that combines elements of modal, temporal, and epistemic logic to prove that the fixed past is not compatible with the open future has recently been presented by Lampert (Analysis 82(3):426–434, 2022). By the construction of a countermodel, it is shown that his line of reasoning is defective. However, it is also explained how Lampert’s argument could be corrected if it were supported with an extra premise regarding the temporal status of a priori knowledge. This additional assumption—which was tacit in the original presentation—is shown to be the weakest link, and it is argued that, despite Lampert’s assurance, it can be plausibly rejected in a roughly Ockhamist framework. Thus, it is concluded that the fixed past poses no threat to the open future; however, a few different lessons about knowledge, necessity, and time are drawn from careful reflection on this novel argument.