Abstract
A public good (PG) is a commodity or service made available to all members of a group: its provision depends on the voluntary contribution of its members. Once provided, all members can enjoy the benefits of the PG, regardless of whether they contributed or not; hence, there is a temptation to “free-ride” in the hope that others will contribute. Rapoport (1987) showed that an important factor that affects cooperation (contribution) in a PG dilemma is the extent to which a group member is critical in providing it. Erev and Rapoport (1990) tested a game-theoretic model that yields deterministic predictions about the effects of criticality on cooperation in public good dilemmas. Based on research by Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996), we propose a probabilistic model of criticality. The model is tested and found to fit empirical data. Extensions of the model to situations with uncertain group size or provision point are discussed.
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