A Probabilistic Framework for Formalizing Epistemic Shifts

Abstract

The term “epistemic shifts” refers to a widely recognized phenomenon that knowledge ascribers would ascribe different epistemic statuses to the same belief under different internal/external conditions. Mainstream theories explaining shifts (including contextualism, contrastivism, and intellectual invariantism) can all be assimilated into a probabilistic framework, according to which the epistemic status of a belief P can be at least partially evaluated in terms of the strength of the link between this belief and its normal truth-maker, namely, a P-corresponding fact, and the strength of this link can be further probabilistically measured in terms of the knowledge-undermining force of an “abnormal” truth-maker of P, namely, a P-inducing fact which itself is not a P-corresponding fact simpliciter. I will further claim that by accepting my framework, a theorist of shifts has to tolerate a pluralist view of the etiology of shifts on the philosophical level, and mainstream theories explaining shifts are flawed in the sense that they all attempt to exaggerate one single and particular factor underpinning shifts by ignoring others.