A privacy protection scheme for smart meter that can verify terminal’s trustworthiness

Abstract

In order to monitor and predict the status of the power grid effectively in real time, smart meters need to send the power information of users to the control center frequently. However, power consumption data may contain users’ privacy, e.g., living habits and hobbies. Further, as the smart meter terminal’s working environment is complex and diverse, and smart meters suffer from endless physical attacks and cyber attacks, so the trustworthiness of smart meters is under threat. Aiming at addressing the problems above, a privacy protection scheme for smart meters that can verify the terminal’s trustworthiness based on trusted computing is proposed in this paper. We design an attribute identity-based signcryption algorithm, and improve the remote anonymous attestation protocol based on the algorithm, which on the one hand realizes privacy protection of smart meters with high efficiency, and on the other hand completes real time verification of the smart meters’ trustworthiness. The specific implementation process of the scheme is given in this paper. The anonymity, privacy protection of the platform configuration, and unforgeability of the scheme are proved in theory. Corresponding experiments show that this scheme has higher computational efficiency than others.