Abstract
The ownership of RFID tag is often transferred from one owner to another in its life cycle. To address the privacy problem caused by tag ownership transfer, we propose a tag privacy model which captures the adversary’s abilities to get secret information inside readers, to corrupt tags, to authenticate tags, and to observe tag ownership transfer processes. This model gives formal definitions for tag forward privacy and backward privacy and can be used to measure the privacy property of tag ownership transfer scheme. We also present a tag ownership transfer scheme, which is privacy-preserving under the proposed model and satisfies the other common security requirements, in addition to achieving better performance.
Highlights
RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) technology is widespread in commercial industry such as supply chain management, inventory management, and access control for people and vehicles
To guarantee security and privacy, a few tag authentication protocols [27, 39,40,41] are based on tags that support public key encryption, and to the best of our knowledge, the authors of [17] presented a complete ownership transfer scheme based on tags supporting elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
Because our ownership transfer protocol TP aims at those tags supporting ECC, the computation cost on tag side is higher than those tags not supporting ECC [18, 20, 26]; the computation cost of the TP is superior to the schemes in [17], which is based on ECC on tags
Summary
RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) technology is widespread in commercial industry such as supply chain management, inventory management, and access control for people and vehicles. A malicious owner has access to the back-end server which stores all the information of readers and tags, and he has advantage to distinguish a tag after the tag ownership transfer or inferring the past activities of a tag when getting the tag’s ownership. Concentrating on tag ownership transfer, we propose a privacy model which introduces strong adversaries, who have abilities to obtain the full information of readers, to authenticate tags, to observe the whole transfer process, and to corrupt tags With this model, we briefly analyze the scheme [17] which is based on public key encryption on tags.
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