A Priori Arguments from God's Abstractness

Abstract

There is a neglected but nevertheless interesting type of a priori argument for it being necessary that God exists that is based upon the conception of God as an abstract entity, i.e., an entity which logically could not exist in either space or time.1 What is distinctive about these arguments is that they employ some premise that is such that the argument works only if it expresses a necessary truth about abstract entities. Four different specimens of this type of argument will be critically considered-St. Anselm's argument in Part I of his response to Gaunilon, along with Malcolm's two variations on it in his 'Anslem's Ontological Argument,' plus a simplified version of my own that clearly brings out the essence of these arguments. It will be shown that all four face the objection that their alleged necessary truth about abstract entities is question-begging. Furthermore, each of the four arguments will be shown to be uncompelling by construction of a parallel argument that contains its alleged necessary truth about abstract entities and other premises that are no less plausible than those of the original but whose conclusion is logically incompatible with that of the original. And, for good measure, it will be argued that there are independent reasons for thinking it false that it is necessary that God exists and thus for holding suspect any argument which has this proposition as its conclusion.