Abstract

In this paper, we will argue that the apparent tendency for large engineering projects to produce other than intended results stems not from the particulars of the projects but, more basically, from representing them as overly simplified, highly linear, and often hyper-rational schemes to begin with. We suggest that a key factor in the tendency to go in unanticipated directions is the inherently difficult to predict effect of ongoing sense-making and multi-level technological learning (Carayannis, E., 1999. Knowledge transfer through technological hyperlearning in five industries. Technovation 19, 141)—feedback with a vengeance, so to speak. Further, since this learning is shaped by social context, various stakeholders may well learn differently. Hence, the practice of reliability engineering, logistics engineering, and systems engineering generally, rather than being bad engineering or bad application of good engineering, can instead be reformulated as an ongoing sense-making activity embedded in an adaptive social process. Three case studies serve as archetypes for three fairly common results. The three cases are ‘Unexpected Opportunity’, ‘Failure then Success’, and ‘Technophobia’. Each case study has two parts. In the first part we present the specifics of the case in abbreviated form. In the second part of each case we place what happened within a common conceptual framework.

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