A power law network in an evolutionary hawk–dove game

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory has attracted the attention of researchers studying game theory as a model of conflict between two players. In this game model, the benefit of an individual player depends on the strategy used by their opponent. Spatial game theory involves the extension of network systems where players can interact with their neighbours, thus expanding the complexity of the system. Cooperation appears to be more dominant in these power-law networks than in the lattices and depends on the network structure. However, little is known about how typical networks emerge using spatial game theories in network systems. Here, I focus on how networks in a spatial hawk-dove game evolve using the connection/disconnection of links. In this study, I develop a novel spatial hawk–dove model that focuses on link evolution. In the proposed model, players connect/disconnect their link with each other, resulting in changing the network structure of an initially regular lattice. In other words, the player sometimes disconnects a link with a neighbour who is a good partner or selects one node as a new partner when the player doubts their position within the local hierarchy. The proposed model generated a characteristic network structure, while demonstrating critical behaviour.