A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the "Laffer curve" for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb-Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the "Laffer curve" in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider- dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.