A Polycentric Vision for Governing the Urban Food Commons

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter uses polycentric governance as a lens for examining alternative governance visions for urban agriculture, or what I refer to as the urban food commons (UFCs). I draw ideas from the political and institutional economics of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to discuss why UFCs cannot be governed through a one-size-fits-all institutional arrangement. I interlace my conceptual arguments with empirical examples, including examples from Kaufman and Bailkey’s classic work. Governing UFCs effectively, I argue, requires a mix of institutional arrangements involving centralized, decentralized, competitive market, cooperative, and command-and-control governance models. A polycentric governance vision moves us closer to building such diverse institutional arrangements to manage undesired outcomes, including the capacity to effectively internalize spillover effects from UFCs. I delineate four institutional design parameters (IDPs) to guide the design and evaluation of a polycentric governance vision for UFCs: (1) multiple decision centers (or actors) that can make decisions about UFCs, (2) opportunities for cross-scale and cross-sector interactions among UFC actors, (3) an overarching system of rules to guide decisions and interactions, and (4) adaptability of the rules to align with actors’ incentives and decisions emanating from the rules. I use Chicago’s nonprofit urban land trust NeighborSpace to illustrate how these IDPs manifest empirically.