A Political Execution: Expediency and the Firing of Vice Admiral Percy W. Nelles, 1943–44

Abstract

On 14 January 1944 the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) announced that the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Percy W. Nelles, was being transferred to the newly created position of Senior Canadian Flag Officer (Overseas) (SCFO[O]). With the invasion of Europe on the horizon, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Angus L. Macdonald, informed Canadians that the RCN's highest-ranking admiral was being sent to the United Kingdom to oversee the navy's participation in this momentous event. Unbeknownst to the public, or even to Prime Minister Winister William Lyon Mackenzie King, Macdonald had been engaged in a bitter confrontation throughout November and December 1943, not only with Nelles, but also with a number of senior officers who formed the Canadian Naval Staff. First discovered by C.P. Stacey, other historians such as W.A.B. Douglas, Marc Milner, and David Zimmerman, have revealed that this dispute focused on a single key issue, currently referred to as the equipment crisis. (1) Collectively, their works have shown that, throughout the first half of the war, the RCN did not possess vital antisubmarine equipment, subsequently leading to a series of disastrous Canadian-escorted convoys. Unlike their Royal Navy (RN) and United States Navy (USN) counterparts, RCN escorts lacked modern radar, asdic (sonar), gyroscopic compasses, and other technical gear, thereby making their convoys more susceptible to U-boat attack. By no means was equipment the only problem that contributed to the RCN's poor results throughout 1941-42; inadequate training and the effects of the navy's rapid expansion also played their part. (2) But by the end of 1943 it was the equipment issue that caught the minister's attention. Originally Nelles's transfer was hailed as a promotion, but the present interpretation is that Macdonald dismissed him because of the equipment crisis. While there is much justification for this interpretation, there were compelling political factors which contributed to Nelles's dismissal. (3) These factors provide valuable insight not only into political-military relations within the navy during the Second World War, but also into the role that certain individuals played in shaping the history of the RCN. The equipment crisis of 1943 and the confrontation with the Naval Staff occasioned a major embarrassment, as the affair pitted Macdonald against his top military advisors. Consequently, it represented a great threat to his credibility and political career. He lost confidence in the RCN's leaders, and even suspected the loyalties of some of his political subordinates such as the Deputy Minister, Gordon Mills. As a result, the only man whom he completely trusted during the crisis was his executive assistant, John Joseph Connolly. In reality, it was Connolly, more than Macdonald, who sealed Nelles's fate. During the summer of 1941, Connolly left behind him a brilliant legal career in Montreal in order to become Macdonald's executive assistant. As such, Connolly rarely found himself in the spotlight and, instead, carried out his duties behind the scenes. This provides a partial reason why his role in Nelles's dismissal, as well as the effect he had on governmental affairs, has been overlooked, since his work would often be credited to Macdonald. (4) One of the duties of an executive assistant is to protect the minister from any politically dangerous scandals. However, Connolly's role and actions in this affair surpassed those usually assigned to an executive assistant and fall within the realm of what J.W. Pickersgill defined as a demi-bureaucrat demi-politician. (5) Afraid that Macdonald would lose his cabinet post if the equipment crisis ever became public knowledge, Connolly devised a strategy designed to protect the minister. The central feature of this plan was to replace Nelles as the Chief of the Naval Staff. This indicates that Nelles's removal was not only inspired by Connolly, but was also politically motivated and therefore more than merely the result of operational deficiencies within the navy. …