A Political Economy of Knowledge Production

Abstract

In his farewell address on January 17, 1961 outgoing President Eisenhower coined the now well worn phrase “military industrial complex” in his warning that there is a danger in the confluence of the government’s military establishment and a growing industrial based serving those interests. Specifically, he cautioned that “(i)n the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist (Eisenhower 1961).” These warnings, as we all know, have gone unheeded and at present estimates direct spending by the US Department of Defense will reach almost $664 billion (OMB 2009, Table S.12) while combined defense related expenditures from all sources including debt service has been over a $1 trillion since 2007 (Higgs 2007). Considering this outlay has only risen since 2007 and the current budget expenditures for 2010 estimated at just under $3.6 trillion (OMB 2009, Table S.1) we can say the military industrial complex feeds on almost $0.30 out of every dollar spent by the US government. Few readers of this journal would doubt that Eisenhower’s concern over the existence of misplaced power accompanied by unwarranted influence was overstated. While some domestic social benefits of military-inspired production can be identified in new materials developed, innovative consumer products available, and the like, it is equally obvious that once such a behemoth is set in motion weaning the political economy from defense related spending is nigh impossible. What district or region of the US does not feed to some degree at that public trough, what Representative or Senator will advocate for a reduction in defense spending if it means his or her district will lose Federal dollars, local tax revenues, jobs and more? One need only look to the political struggle in the 1990s surrounding the attempt to identify and then close underutilized and unnecessary military bases around the country to see the scope of the challenge. In the end, the urgency of building a defense apparatus during the Cold War in the post World War II era of confrontation blinded almost everyone to the dangers so clearly outlined by Eisenhower above. A real danger, aside from the incredible drain on the national weal, is that once Critical Sociology 36(4) 483-487