A political economy approach to endogenous industrial policies

Abstract

This paper uses a political economy perspective to study the endogenous formation of economic policies and its interplay with political institutions. This paper provides a novel view that both the institutions and economic development status are essential factors in endogenously determining economic policies. The model aims to explain both the differences in the degree of adopting industrial policies as well as the differences in the types of industrial policies being implemented. Using a concise framework with two country-specific characteristics, the baseline model can capture three main types of industrial policy platforms of interest. In a country where voters’ political awareness is positively skewed and press freedom is relatively low, pro-heavy industry policies would be present most of the time; South Korea is representative of this type of countries. In a country where voters’ political awareness is positively skewed and press freedom is relatively high, there is usually an active industrial policy, though the target of the policy changes over time. Specifically, the policy is favoring the industry of which the industry-specific TFP is relatively high; Japan is representative of this type of countries. In a country where voters’ political awareness is negatively skewed and press freedom is relatively high, there is usually no active industrial policy; the U.S. is representative of this type of countries.