Abstract
The Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture (UR) has contributed to the increase in U.S. and world rice trade since 1994. Despite this, the Japanese and Korean rice markets continue to be characterized by high levels of trade intervention. This paper attempts to analyze both import markets incorporating econometric estimates and public choice theory in a game theoretic framework. Various scenarios are analyzed. The results show that the overall Nash equilibrium occurs with a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under the U.S. Market Development Program, which includes the Market Access Program and Foreign Market Development Program.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
