A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes

Abstract

After debating for the past decade the merits of the war power, executive privilege, impoundment, and other struggles between Congress and the president, along comes another topic of constitutional interest: the 'legislative Several hundred statutory provisions currently require the president and executive officials to report administration proposals to Congress, on the understanding that Congress (within a specified number of days) may disapprove the intended action. Another variation is to place upon the administration the burden of obtaining congressional approval within the time allowed by statute. Depending on the statute, congressional action may be taken by one or both houses. But whatever the procedure, these legislative actions are not presented to the president for his signature or veto. The great danger at the present time is the temptation to join one of two rival camps. One choice: the legislative veto is an essential means of controlling the bureaucracy and maintaining representative government. Alternatively: the legislative veto violates the separation of powers doctrine and evades the president's veto power. My contention is that the issue, presented in this manner, is wrongly framed. The legislative veto is not a simple substance, to be disposed of one way or the other. No single constitutional theory can either exonerate it or invalidate it. We confront not an element but many different compounds, some easier to justify legally and politically than others. Although proponents and opponents of the legislative veto are urging the courts to settle the issue, we cannot expect a neat resolution in this area any more than we could with the war power, executive privilege, or