A Polish Chapter in Civil War America: The Effects of the January Insurrection on American Opinion and Diplomacy (review)

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS263 just as frequently as draftees in rich districts" (p. 230, note 18; Appendix B, pp. 211-215). Thus, declares the author, commutation was not unduly harsh on low-income groups, and there is little or no merit to the charge that the Civil War was "a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight." However accurate this judgment may in fact be, the author's method in reaching it is too faulty to produce conclusive results. Despite these shortcomings the study has much that is worthwhile. It depicts with restraint and good judgment a seamy side of the war that needed to be told; it rescues from an undeserved limbo General James B. Fry, Director of the Civil War drafts and an able leader about whom more should be written; it advances convincing evidence that Governor Horatio Seymour not only handled ineptly the draft riots in New York City (July, 1863), but persistently and defiantly opposed the Federal government in its efforts to enforce the conscription laws; and it points out the relationship between commutation, bounties, and substitution, showing how changes in laws governing one affected the behavior and response of men eligible for military service. Much-deserved criticism is directed at the bounty system—especially at local bounties, which, since they were paid in advance and were neither fixed nor uniform, caused many desertions, numerous cases of bountyjumping , and needless delays in recruitment (the prospective recruit held out as long as he could to drive the best possible bargain). This volume, which readers will find informative, useful, and entertaining , shows that during the Civil War the conduct of many people, civilians and military personnel alike, was dictated by self-interest and the quest for money, and not by patriotism. Frederick D. Williams Michigan State University A Polish Chapter in Civil War America: The Effects of the January Insurrection on American Opinion and Diplomacy. By Joseph W. Wieczerzak .(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1967. Pp. 264. $6.00.) Civil War diplomacy has on the whole been dealt widi adequately in die works of Jordan Donaldson and Edwin J. Pratt, Ephraim Adams, and Frank L. Owsley. However, the impact of the Polish uprising in 1863 against Russia upon wartime diplomacy has indeed received scant attention . Professor Wieczerzak has tried to fill this gap in this small volume. An examination of the bibliography and notes indicates that he had access to a sizable collection of newspapers, diplomatic correspondence, and other official documents pertinent to his study. The Washington government wanted sympathetic neutrality from the European states, but contrary to its expectations it received instead open coolness, particularly from the English and French governments who seemed to favor the Confederates. Such incidents as the Polish revolt 264civil war history could actually assist northern diplomacy by diverting European attention from the American scene. The Richmond government, on the other hand, wanted diplomatic recognition and possibly other aid, and therefore needed to keep the war and the issue of southern independence in sharp focus. Divergent episodes in Europe weakened its effort. Professor Wieczerzak's book, which was supported by the Kosciuszko Foundation as a contribution to its Millennium Series, shows clearly that bodi the North and Soudi realized fully die diplomatic implications of the Polish insurrection. But, and this is a recurring thread throughout die study, botii sides were abo ambivalent in tiieir views, especially as seen in an analysis of newspaper opinion. Not surprisingly, northern editors generally tried to cast Russia in a favorable light, for alone among the major European powers she had shown a friendliness to the Union cause. Furthermore, relations between Great Britain and Russia were strained, and since the Palmerston government showed litde enthusiasm for the North, St. Petersburg and Washington drew closer together. Still, northern newspapers could not entirely abandon die traditional American support for peoples who tried to cast off the yoke of foreign oppression. And they also knew that the revolt diverted English and French attention from southern appeals. In die Soutii, editors could and did sharply castígate Czar Alexander's regime and saw parallels between the southern and Polish efforts to achieve freedom. They professed to see similarities in the roles of...