Abstract
In this essay, I motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. The core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of (teleological) practical rationality that is put in the service of various epistemic goals. First, I sketch some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. Second, I present my preferred, pluralistic version of the view, and I sketch some of its benefits. Third, I defend the view against a prominent objection recently offered against a class of closely related views by Selim Berker. Last, I raise some distinct, lingering worries, and I sketch some possible ways one might address them.
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