Abstract
Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
Highlights
Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware
The problem is especially acute in national security issues such as the monitoring and verification of nuclear arms control agreements, where the ability to generate and act upon authentic, trustworthy, and accurate information about the nature and status of nuclear arsenals can help manage tensions, de-escalate crisis, and reduce the risks of nuclear weapon use
As we show here for the first time, the responses of the optical physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can be made intentionally dependent on non-trivial physical stochastic effects such as exposure to low levels of ionizing radiations, in particular neutrons
Summary
Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. In principle, designing secure sensors for arms control verification is not fundamentally different than for sensitive consumer or industrial applications: It requires demonstrating that the sensor data is authentic and truthful, and that the sensors themselves have not been compromised during their manufacturing by the addition of malicious functionalities, including the ability to manipulate data or secretly leak sensitive information that should not be revealed or even acquired in the first place To meet these requirements, traditional security and privacy solutions involve the use of cryptographic algorithms running on trusted hardware to authenticate and encrypt measured values a posteriori and outside the sensor media, and black-box tamper-indicating enclosures to limit physical access to critical components and information such as encryption k eys[7].
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