Abstract

Digital systems are almost always vulnerable, yet we increasingly depend on these systems. There will be many threats towards these system. In a fully networked system, the vulnerabilities will literally be exposed to the whole world. The exposed vulnerabilities may be transformed into attacks. To counter this state of “vulnerability”, the standard remedy is to conduct security requirements analysis and security threat modeling. Threats are assessed, and various countermeasures are devised. The totality of these measures may be described as a security architecture. The goal of a security architecture will largely be to make the system robust and resilient in the face of an adversary. However, we shall argue that this is not enough. Security architecture designs should go one step further, and actually improve the defenses when faced with hostile actions. That is, the security architectures must become antifragile.

Highlights

  • The requirements for a security architecture is very much about the level of uncertainty one wants to endure and the risks one is willing to take.1.1 Why Philosophy?There certainly are many technical aspects of modern information and communications technology (ICT) systems and the associated security architectures

  • Chapter 7 is an argument for a threat modeling mindset

  • To be explicit about intended exposure does not guarantee that the attack surface is well-contained, but it will at least indicate that the problem has been considered

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Summary

Why Philosophy?

There certainly are many technical aspects of modern information and communications technology (ICT) systems and the associated security architectures. On a systems level, the end goal of a security architecture are normally not technical in nature. The goals tend to be more philosophical They may be framed in a context of moral and ethics, and sometimes in the framework of legislation and societal rules. Modern ICT infrastructures are becoming integrated into our lives in many ways, and our society is poised to become even more dependent on these ICT systems. This means that safe and secure operations of these critical infrastructures literally becomes a matter of life and death. This is why there is a need for a philosophical stance when it comes to security architectures

Security Versus Safety and Privacy
The Incerto
Key Concepts
Requirements Capture
Not Everything Will Be Standardized
Proactive‐ Versus Reactive Measures
Threat Analysis Philosophy
Basics Steps
Center‐of‐Gravity
Threat Management
Related Work
Paper Layout
Attitudes of System Designs
Process Goals
Self‐Evident and Obvious Aspects
Explicitness
Plan for Success
Success Means Long‐Term
Long‐Term Means Change
The Red Queen’s Race
Long‐Term Means Dependencies
There Will Be Failures
Kill Your Darlings
2.2.10 Delusion and Self‐Delusion
2.2.11 The Weakest Link
The 5D Lifecycle Phases
Design Phase Freedom
Development Phase Freedom
Deployment Phase Freedom
Decommissioning Phase Freedom
Fallback and Backwards Compatibility Considered Harmful
Fallback
Backwards Compatibility
Containment
The Stoic Philosophical Attitude: “Keep Calm and Carry On”
Limits to Predictability
Non‐linearity
Large‐Scale Systems are Non‐linear
Normal Accidents
Estimating Risk
Antifragile
On Existential Risks and the Precautionary Principle
Sustainable Risks and Scalability
Threats
Vulnerabilities
Inconsistencies
Exposure and Attack Surfaces
Cyber Kill Chain Considerations
Defense Strategies
Redundancy by Design
Segmentation and Coupling
Defense‐in‐Depth
Strong Proactive Security Measures
Capable Reactive Security Measures
Threat Modeling
Summary
Living with Uncertainty
The Design Principles
Precautionary principle
Conclusions
Full Text
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